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CRIMINAL THEORY:
An Appraisal of Jerome Hall's STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE
AND CRIMINAL THEORYt
GERHARD 0. W. MUELLERt
It is quite easy to state what may be right in particular cases
(quid sit juris), as being what the laws of a certain place and
of a certain time may say or may have said; but it is much
more difficult to determine whether what they have enacted
is right in itself, and to lay down a universal criterion by which
Right and Wrong in general, and what is just and unjust, may
be recognized. All this may remain entirely hidden even from
the practical jurist until he abandon his empirical principles
for a time, and search in the Pure Reason for the sources of
such judgments, in order to lay a real foundation for actual
positive Legislation. In this search his empirical Laws may,
indeed, furnish him with excellent guidance; but a merely em-
pirical system that is void of rational principles is, like the
wooden head in the fable of Phaedrus, fine enough in appear-
ance, but unfortunately it wants brain.
IMMANUEL KANT'
Professor Hall has added another book to his already long list of
distinguished publications. Studies in Jurisprudence and Criminal Theory
reproduces some of his best essays, many of which had not been pre-
viously readily accessible to the lawyer, and also contains significant new
chapters, in the realm of jurisprudence and criminal law theory. This
book is not a self-contained segment of work but, rather, a cross section
of works, and not just of any scholar, but of an unusually original
thinker. Moreover, the subjects joined in this book have rarely, if ever,
been combined in this country. The result of this joinder is a new area
of inquiry, criminal theory.
INTEGRATIVE JURISPRUDENCE
Before discussing the fusion at which I hinted, the reader should be
reminded of Hall's jurisprudential contribution to Western thought, quite
t New York: Oceana Publications. 1958. Pp. vi, 300. Hereinafter cited as STUDIES.
: Associate Professor of Law; Director, Comparative Criminal Law Project, New
York University, School of Law.
1. KANT, THE PHlOSOPHY OF LAW-AN ExPosIToN OF THE FuNDAMENTAL PRIN-
CIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE ScIENcE OF RIGHT 44 (1797, Hastie transl. 1887).
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apart from his independently unique efforts in criminal law. Although
Hall had indicated the flight of his ideas in earlier publications, the first
major disclosure of his jurisprudential program occurred in 1947, when
he wrote on Integrative Jurisprudence in Interpretations of Modern Legal
Philosophies.'
Integrative Jurisprudence has its immediate orientation in a
persistent effort to correct the most serious fallacy in modern
jurisprudence: the sophisticated separation of value, fact and
idea (form). This fallacy is manifested in the particularism
of prevailing legal philosophies, i.e. in their restriction to, or
concentration on, one of the above spheres of significance, with
consequent exaggeration and error. The premise of this criti-
cism is that the soundest measure of any legal philosophy is its
'adequacy.' 'Adequacy' requires of a legal philosophy: (1) ul-
timacy-that it be constructed on simple, irreducible ideas that
are intellectually defensible; (2) comprehensiveness-that, so
far as possible, it take account of all significant aspects of legal
problems (a corollary is that it be 'necessary' in the sense of
omitting the unimportant); and (3) consistency-that doc-
trines defended and results obtained in dealing with some prob-
lems be not contradicted by those maintained elsewhere-not
only in a strictly formal sense, but also as regards the general
coherence of jurisprudence.3
Tested by these criteria, Natural Law Philosophy is guilty of the
particularistic fallacy of divorcing value from fact; American Legal
Realism was' guilty of the exaggeration of fact to the virtual exclusion
of value, and Legal Positivism, exemplified by Kelsen's Pure Theory of
Law, is guilty of the gravest inconsistency of all by being anti-empirical
and devoid of ethical value. The "inadequacy" of these schools is there-
by indicated. Hall himself spent great efforts elaborating on these de-
ficiencies.' Integrative Jurisprudence became the answer to the particu-
laristic fallacies. This new philosophy is a "pluralism" which "insists on
the inclusion of relevant ideas, facts, and evaluations, in compliance with
the criteria of adequacy."'  Stated in the most concise possible terms,
Integrative Jurisprudence posits, first, that "law originates in a sovereign
2. INTERPRETATION OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 313 (Sayre ed. 1947).
3. Ibid.; STUDIES 25.
4. Use of the past tense conforms to Hall's style and estimation.
5. STUDIES, chs. 2, 7, 8; HALL, LIVING LAW OF DEmOCRATIC SocI~y passim (1949);
Hall, Reason and Reality in Jurisprudence, 7 BUFFALO L. REv. 351 (1958).
6. STUDIES 37.
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and is expressed in a distinctive normative form composed of two de-
scriptive propositions, one designating a harm, the other, a physical
sanction, both being joined by a copula signifying must, an imperative
'shall' . : . . [second] the teleological quality of these norms and their
embodiment of, or relation to, values. Finally, there is a factual dimen-
sion of law manifested in conduct and institutions which express the legal
ideas, and in artifacts into which those ideas are read."'7
Integrative Jurisprudence was well received.' Indeed, a realistic re-
turn to "justice" as the core concept of all legal endeavour has since re-
ceived recognition as the basic criterion of the most significant school or
trend of jurisprudence today, outside neo-Thomistic Natural Law. Be-
ing in various degrees of propinquity in thought to Hall's Integrative
Jurisprudence, such significant thinkers as Edmond N. Cahn, Edwin W.
Patterson, Huntington Cairns, Morris R. Cohen and Lon Fuller, and
among the judiciary the late Mr. Justice Cardozo, have likewise sub-
scribed to an axiological legal philosophy, though sometimes with a lesser
emphasis on the positive foundation of law.
In evaluating Integrative Jurisprudence one must not overlook the
fact that this philosophy relies in part on positivism, Hall's stringent re-
jection of the Pure Law Theory notwithstanding. "Positivism" is broad
enough to include the anti-axiological Pure Law Theory on one extreme
and axiological positivism in the form of Integrative Jurisprudence on
the other. It is difficult to perceive how positivism, to form an ade-
quate jurisprudence, can be anything but axiological. Is it not clear that
a statement of legal rules devoid of consideration of the values which
have produced them and in which they function, would be more like a
death mask, rather than a life cast, of the living image, law? Moreover,
the law constantly incorporates existing and presumably ascertainable
values by reference. Thus, when a legal mandate provides that for con-
viction of crime a mens rea must be proven, the word "red" incorporates
a meta-legal value by reference and makes it a legal standard. If it were
otherwise, i.e., if rea were interpreted to refer only to the objective fact
that a certain conduct is prohibited, convictions would befall the populace
without discrimination between those who breached the law knowingly
and with design, and those who breached it by happenstance or despite
the exercise of the utmost care.9
In order to construct a new jurisprudence which was to absorb the
lead ideas of the three existing schools of thought, Hall had to master
7. Id. at 89.
8. E.g., REUSCHLEIN, JURISPRUDENCE-ITs AMERICAN PROPHETS 445-58 (1951).
9. See Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MINN. L. Rmv. 1043 (1958).
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them all. That he is an expert craftsman with the tools of realism, he
demonstrated as early as 1935 in Theft, Law and Society; that he is well
grounded in positivism, he evinced in The Living Law of Democratic
Society (1949) and the General Principles of Crimhinal Law (1947), and
that he is as skillful with values as any Natural Law philosopher, he
demonstrated more than once.1" These are but examples, yet they all at-
test to an unusual alertness which has kept Hall from falling into the
typical booby traps of those philosophies.
Plato's Legal Philosophy" takes a special place among Hall's juris-
prudential writings. A Freudian psychoanalyst-I am sure Hall himself
would detest the mere thought-might find this essay a gold mine of
information about Hall's character and personality structure. Suffice it
to say that Plato is probably the most significant single factor in the de-
velopment of Hall's mature thoughts. He found Plato to be a constant
source of inspiration. "Even though one disagrees with Plato on many
points," he wrote, "it is impossible to remain insensitive to the sweep of
his imagination. Centering on law and the political community, he created
a world-picture in which every important phase of human experience
found an intelligible place in significant interrelations to all the other
major components of the cosmos. . . . [Yet] positive law is the central
thread which unifies Plato's philosophy."' 2 The totality of Platonic phi-
losophy became the central thread which unifies Hall's writings on juris-
prudence and criminal theory.
Legal philosophers frequently are eminently impractical. Integra-
tive Jurisprudence, on the other hand, was created and is fit for practical
application. 3 This requires special comment, as it will strike the reader
so many times in the course of reading Hall's new work. 4
Legal philosophy, or jurisprudence in that sense, is, of course, noth-
ing but that lofty inquiry about law "from the heights of maximum
generalization." It is the "master science," and there is a long way down
to "the valley below, where positive law functions."'" Now, it is entirely
up to each philosopher to choose his position and approach, though he
who functions solely in the heaven of philosophers cannot expect either
to be understood by those in the valleys below, or, indeed, to influence
their actions in any way whatsoever, quite apart from the fact that such
10. E.g., Hall, Plato's Legal Philosophy, 31 IND. L.J. 171 (1956), now STuiEs, ch.
3. See also Hall, Reason and Reality in Jurisprudence, 7 BUFFALO L. Rav. 351 (1958).
11. STUDIES, Ch. 3.
12. Id. at 81-82.
13. See, e.g., STUDnIS, ch. 4, Unification of Political and Legal Theory.
14. Expressed particularly in STUDIES, ch. 1, Legal Theory and Jurispridence, and
ch. 9, Legal Classification.
15. STUDIES 8.
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a heavenly philosopher's thoughts are bound to be so highly unrealistic
as to be practically useless. The sphere between the lofty heights of juris-
prudence and law in action is filled by thought levels of various degrees
of abstraction. "Thus, legal theory is distinguished from positive law
and the immediate elucidation of the rules and doctrines comprising posi-
tive law by its greater generality and its organizational functions..
[L]egal theory is distinguished from jurisprudence in that the latter
deals . . . . [with] universal conceptions and generalizations."' 6
Each of the three levels of legal-intellectual abstraction in turn may
be divisible into various spheres. Thus, positive law itself, as the term
implies, deals with the rules of law, as well as with their immediate ap-
plication. Jurisprudence, on the other extreme, may similarly be viewed
as involving various concentrations of universal generalization. But the
subdivisions of legal theory are perhaps the clearest. In abstracto, Hall
demonstrated this splendidly on the example of criminal law, and I shall
try to elaborate on this demonstration in concreto. This, then, is an emi-
nently practical use of jurisprudence, one which differs from the typical
jurisprudential (philosophical) statement about law in general, in that it
penetrates through various levels of generalization until it reaches and
directly affects positive law.
THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL THEORY
At the risk of harping on the familiar, I should like to start with
the observation that during the last one hundred years our law has ex-
perienced more change than in all its previous history. I am not refer-
ring to the problem of population growth and congestion, the develop-
ment of swift communication and transportation, means of mass pro-
duction and destruction. True enough, these posed many legal prob-
lems and challenged the ingenuity of the lawyer, and, on the whole, true
to his tradition, he has succeeded in finding quid sit juris.as each situa-
tion arose. But all these are but symptoms or penumbral issues. The
change of our law lies deeper. The change I have in mind is that from
an unsophisticated legal system to one of great and ever increasing organi-
zation and refinement. Classification and organization of the law was
iot needed when precedents and authorities were few in number. But
the expanding legal system of the late 19th century could no longer rely
on 'the memory of man exclusively. Classification and organization be-
came'necessary. Initially, it was not the scholar who performed this
task for our system-unlike in continental experience-but, rather, the
law .publisher, primarily West and Sheppad"
16. Id. at 10-11.
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I have briefly indicated how, according to Hall, human interest in
and occupation with the law proceeds on various levels of generalization,
abstraction and sophistication. If the rule of law itself, quid sit juris, is
the most basic level, it is readily apparent that organization and classifi-
cation must constitute the next higher echelon of thought, or a part
thereof. In Hall's terms, this is the level of theory, as distinguished
from that of positive law. Now, it is obvious to every member of the
profession that a digest rests on a fairly unsophisticated theoretical level,
as it may be a mere alphabetical ordering, and perhaps that is sufficient
for its purpose, i.e., that of a precedent finder. If these commercial en-
deavors helped in the better refinement and organization of our law, this
was a welcome incidental effect. But is, or should this be, the sole am-
bition of legal theory? Hall postulates that theory has elucidation for one
of its principal purposes, so that, if a digest elucidates, however coinci-
dentally, it fulfills at least one of the functions of theory. But elucida-
tion is more than mere classification, and legal theory, indeed, demands
more than mere elucidation. "Legal theory in its widest range deals
with ideas common to one or more branches or systems of positive law,
and it thus consists of more general propositions than those which im-
mediately elucidate positive law."1  Anybody who wishes to reach this
aim must abandon the publishers' organization for a more perfect system.
By bringing the principles of scientific classification, as developed,
e.g., by biology or chemistry, to bear, and keeping in mind that it is a
specific body of laws rather than insects or herbs we are trying to clas-
sify, a legal classification can be achieved which is both scientific and
practical. Such a classification attempt requires that (1) it be a con-
tinuous and dynamic, rather than a static, endeavor, (2) we drop the
notion that one classification is as good as another, (3) we discover the
basic distinctive unit or data comprising our subject matter, (4) we
divide those units or data into types according to their basic properties,
observing, however, that any such classification must aid in facilitating
the discovery of wider generalizations, and (5) it must represent signifi-
cant uniformities and relationships. 8 By these criteria, the Western
world, since Roman times,'" has divided law into public and private law.
The Romans subdivided further into the law of persons, of property, and
of procedure," and Bracton transplanted this system into English law.2
Whether these divisions of both systems were the best possible may be
17. STUDIES 9.
18. Id. at 144-45.
19. INSTITUTES 1.1.4.
20. Id. at 1.2.12.
21. PoTrE, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW 271 (3d ed. 1948).
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a matter of dispute. Nor, of course, is it clear that our seven or eight
subdivisions of public and private law are the best we can find. But it
is significant to note that while Anglo-American law has been inimical
to further and more detailed classification, although in a few fields it has
yielded thereto to some extent, the bodies of Roman and Civil law are
systematically classified and thus divisible into ever more minute cate-
gories. This gives them the appearance of thoroughly organized and
logical systems-and, indeed, they are.
Applying the demands of legal theory and the principles of scientific
classification to the criminal law, a category which as such is certainly
not assailable, Hall has developed a criminal law theory, the first on this
continent, which is fully adequate and can constitute the necessary basis
for any reform our criminal law may need. The significance of this
achievement can best be understood if we return to history once more.
American legal scholarship in criminal law has traditionally focused
on two principal forms of expression, the practitioner's text and the case
book. It is unlikely that anybody will disagree with the proposition that
the criminal law texts of the past 100 years are dry, casuistic restate-
ments of what courts have said in criminal matters. Their usefulness
suffered because their authors had to sacrifice criticism and independent
thought for inclusiveness and reconciliation of conflicting lines of deci-
sions in one or several jurisdictions. Even Bishop, Wharton and Bur-
dick could not free themselves of the custom of the time though they,
more than any others, evidenced a true maturity of thought. In criminal
law the more reputable scholarship turned to the production of case books.
Fourteen years before Professor Langdell had the idea of making up a
case book (in contracts) for use in the Harvard Law School, the first
American case book in criminal law appeared on the market in Chicago.
Unfortunately, the case books were just as dry and uninspiring as the
texts, nor were they meant to be inspiring. It is safe to say that until
1925 there was no change in this form of scholarship. It was at that
time that Roscoe Pound, disgusted with the stale and fossile approach of
scholarship in criminal law, which could produce nothing better than col-
lections of edited appellate decisions, called for a progressive criminal
law scholarship. A society riding in automobiles for business, pleasure
and crime, psychoanalyzing itself and developing a science of sociology,
needed a modern criminal law, and Pound felt that only the scholar could
provide it."
There was some response to Pound's demands in the new editions
22. Pound, What Can Law Schools Do for Criminal Justice?, 6 Am. L. ScHooL
REv. 127 (1927).
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of some older case books, and Professors Sayre, Harno, L. Hall and
S. Glueck, among others, cautiously introduced some realism in their new
works. But it was not until 1940 that American legal scholarship in the
case book field matured to perfection. The new era began with Michael
& Wechsler, Criminal Law and Its Administration.23  This book joined
law and the social sciences with exceptional success. Both the analytical-
normative and the social importance of crime and its repression received
their fair share. David Riesman wrote: "Michael and Wechsler make
law a social science by being steadily comparative, legislative, and juris-
prudential-drawing upon the resources of the other social sciences."24
Criminal law scholarship was no longer the same, and many of the sub-
sequent case books, foremost Dession's,2" attested to this fact.
It was this new inquisitive approach which resulted directly in the
magnificent effort of the American Law Institute to draft a Model Penal
Code, under Professor Wechsler's supervision.26 This country has there-
by reached a parallel point to the era of great modern European codifica-
tions from 1870 to about 1910, but it has the additional advantage of
greater insight through the data which the social sciences have since
made available, and this data is being fully employed.17
But there is one basic difference between the great continental codi-
fication efforts and the present American enterprise. European scholar-
ship could operate with a body of well organized knowledge, splendidly
classified and refined to perfection. Here, on the other hand, the social
science data are brought to bear on what is, for the most part, a crude
body of dogma, more representative of the peasant society which founded
it than the age of Einstein.
We must realize that the introduction of scientific knowledge into
the body of criminal law in and by itself does not convert that body into
a science. It is only when the body of knowledge which constitutes the
criminal law is itself properly and deeply analyzed and organized that
we can speak of a beginning science of criminal law. Such an analysis
and organization must be achieved with the tools of the scientist, and
that is the function of criminal theory, as developed in this country only
23. See Riesman, Law and Social Science: A Report on Michael and Wechsler's
Classbook on Criminal Law and Administration, 50 YALE L.J. 636 (1941).
24. Id. at 645.
25. CaimiNAL. LAw, ADmINISTRATION AND PUBLIC ORDER (1948).
26. See Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1097
(1952); Wechsler, The American Law Institute: Some Observations on Its Model Pe-
nal Code, 42 A.B.AJ. 321 (1956).
27. See, e.g., Excerpts from Correspondence Between Dr. Manfred Guttmnacher and
Herbert Wechsler Relating to the Problem of Defining the Criteria of Irresponsibility in
the Model Penal Code, MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, appendix C (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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now, principally through Professor Hall. If the criminal law body is
thus properly prepared, the data of science can be applied with greater
ease and success, because the data will then be comparable.
In 1947 and 1949, when the "Principles" and Hall's casebook ap-
peared, Hall stood practically alone in advocating progress through
theory, i.e., greater knowledge through greater organization and refine-
ment. Ten years later, in 1959, there is a growing collegium of scholars
with an equal or similar outlook. Professor Wingersky has produced a
magnificent new treatise on crime,28 and so has Professor Perkins,29 so
that, for the first time in this country, we have well organized and theo-
retically sound and inclusive criminal law treatises. Professors L. Hall
and S. Glueck have switched their casebook from the traditional system
of subject presentation to the theoretically organized approach,8" and the
contributions to legal periodicals reflecting the maturity of the new ap-
proach are too numerous to be mentioned.
The two great endeavors in criminal law, that of elucidation in the
process of codification and that through criminal theory, are fascinating
events. There is no rivalry between the two approaches; nor is there a
sufficient amount of cooperation. But we can predict that should the
two forces combine their powerful resources," the benefit to American
criminal law is bound to be significant. Since there are no wonder drugs
against criminality, only a well prepared deep-cutting operation can ulti-
mately tackle the problem of the rising crime rate. And it is with such
a result in mind that I make mention of future benefits.
It is when viewed in this context that the significance of Hall's
criminal theory becomes truly apparent.
THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
Hall's legal theory provides us with a basis for better organization
and recognition of our subject. Like any theory, it is concerned with
statements about and within the subject, the instant subject being that of
positive criminal law.
In a valuable essay, which, unfortunately, was omitted from his
recent book, Hall wrote: "In place of [the European bipartition of
criminal law] . . . I suggest a threefold division. I retain the special
part just as do the above codes . . . [but] I divide the general part into
28. CLARK & MARSHALL, CPIMES (6th ed. rev. Wingersky 1958).
29. PERKINS, CRImINAL LAW (1957).
, 30. L. HALL & S. GLUECK, CRIMINAL LAW AND ENFORCEMENT (4th ed. 1958).
31. Compared with the growing number of theoretical scholars, supra, note the
steadily growing list, of collaborators on the Model Penal Code project. MODEL PENAL
COIIE IV-VI (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). But, note also that the lists of the two schools
a r almbst.mutually exclusie."., . .. -
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two divisions which I call doctrines and principles." 2  The special part
contains the rules, stated in terms of the least generalization, the general
part the doctrines, of greater generalization, and the principles, of great-
est generalization. "If one understands the principles of criminal law,
one has the tools to work with and analyze any crime."" While rules
and doctrines rest on the level of positive law, Hall holds that the prin-
ciples are so generalized as to rest in legal theory, perhaps entirely so.
He explains the function of the principles thus: "The positive law of
crimes, i.e. the rules and doctrines of that branch of law, can be elucidated
and organized by use of certain conceptions and principles, namely, in
terms of legality, harm, conduct, mens rea, the concurrence of the latter
two, causation and punishment. These conceptions and the principles
which include them refer to the totality of the rules and doctrines of
criminal law."34  In other words, for the best possible elucidation of
criminal law, we can state the propositions of and about this subject in
terms of a hierarchy of conceptions, with the most generalized concep-
tions at the top (principles), the less general conceptions at the middle
level (doctrines) and the least generalized conceptions (rules) at the bot-
tom, analogues to the division of legal science into jurisprudence, theory
and positive law, though it should be clear that the mere analogy does
not lift the principles into the realm of legal philosophy.
Hall did not stop at positing his theory, but he constantly endeavored
to explain the conceptions in terms of which the theory is stated. Thus,
at various places, he had dealt with each of the principles: legality, 5
harm," conduct, 7 mens rea,38 concurrence," causation," and punish-
ment. 1 Having worked with these concepts for several years, I found
them to constitute a fully satisfactory theory of our subject. The most
significant aspect of this theory, in my opinion, is the high degree of fi-
delity with which it portrays the actualities of the unorganized mass of
criminal law as applied in our courts since time immemorial. This is an
32. Hall, The Three Fundamental Aspects of Criminal Law, 8 J. CRIm. L. 1 (To-
kyo 1957).
33. Id. at 3.
34. STUDIs 10.
35. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES oF CRIMINAL LAW, ch. 2 (1947).
36. Id. chs. 3 and 4, especially in terms of completed and inchoate harm, though
the concept as such was briefly explained in HALL, CASES AND READINGS ON -CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDuRE 45-46 (1949).
37. HALL, op. cit. mipra note 35, passim, especially chs. 7-9.
38. Id. chs. 5-6, 10-14; Hall, Ignorance dnd Mistake in Criminal Law, 33 IND. L.J.
1 (1957); Hall, Ignorantia Legis, 26 REv. INT'L DE" DROIT PENAL 293 (1955).
39. HALL, CASES AND READINGS ON CRIINrAL LAW AND. PROCEDURE 70-73.,(1949).
40. STrUES, ch. 10.
41. HALL, op. cit. supra note 35, ch. 15.
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aspect which, it seems to me, Professor Hall has not yet had a chance
to explore fully.
The key to the correspondence of theory and actuality lies in the
maxim actu non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, which we can expand to the
proposition that crime is a concurrence of actus reus and nes rea, sub-
ject to punishment. This, indeed, is an acceptable definition of crime,
though some may wish to except regulatory offenses. It is my conten-
tion that this definition, certainly one which has influenced the behavior
of criminal courts more than any other, contains all the principles of
criminal law which Professor Hall included in his list. Actus stands for
conduct, as no one will doubt, and, hence, reus indicates that it is only
conduct of a certain nature with which the criminal law is concerned,
namely evil, or guilty, or prohibited conduct." This, in turn, however, is
nothing but a reference to the prohibition which is a concept composed of
two principles, namely that of harm, which refers to the prohibited end
effect of conduct, and that of legality, by which the fact of prohibition
is to be ascertained. Mens rea refers to the frame of mind as related to
the prohibtion. It is, therefore, something different from, or greater
than, the mere mental element which is a requisite of conduct as such.
The concurrence of actus reus and mens reca is likewise indicated in the
definition, as is the requisite punishment. Causation, lastly, while not
specifically expressed, is necessarily included to relate conduct and
harm, as it is only by rules of causation that any connection between the
two can be established.
The ancient definition of crime, therefore, contains reference to all
the principles of criminal law. These principles themselves can be dem-
onstrated in terms of doctrines. Thus, e.g., the principle of mens rea is
explainable only by reference to the doctrines referring to ignorance or
error of fact or law, necessity, coercion, self-defense, etc.4" Indeed, our
traditional insanity doctrine" is nothing but an elaboration on conduct
42. At one time in the history of English criminal law all punishable conduct was
known by all to be evil, hence retts. Today, in the "welfare" state, this no longer holds
true, so that reus has acquired the frequently useful and applicable meaning "prohibited."
43. I shall refrain from going into the details of mens rea and conduct, as I had
occasion recently to express my thoughts on these principles in detail. See Mueller,
On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MINN. L. REv. 1043 (1958). See also text accompany-
ing note 72 infra.
44. Professor Hall's splendid defense of the M'Naughten rules, Psychiatry and
Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.J. 761 (1956), is reproduced in STUDIES, ch. 15. See
also Hall, Responibility and Law: In Defense of the McNaghten Rules, 42 A.B.A.J.
917 (1956) ; Hall, Mental Disease and Criminal Responsibility-M'Naghten versus Dur-
ham and the American Law Institute's Tentative Draft, 33 IND. LJ. 212 (1958). For
an excellent article in support of Professor Hall's position see Hofstadter & Levittan,
The McNaughten Rides-A Re-Appraisal and a Proposal, 140 N.Y.L.J., issues 53-57, at
pp. 4 (1958).
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and inens reca, thus, doctrinal matter subsumed under these principles.
When the M'Naughten rules refer to the inability to know the nature and
quality of the act, they make a doctrinal statement with reference to con-
duct. It is a statement about those who, by reason of defect resulting
from mental disease, are unable to engage in conduct altogether. When
the M'Naughten rules refer to the inability to know the difference be-
tween right and wrong in concreto, the doctrinal reference is to the ab-
sence of inens rea., because the substance of mens reca is nothing but an
awareness or appreciation of the wrongfulness or prohibited quality of
the conduct."'
In an effort to demonstrate the utility and clarity of the principles,
it may be well to allude to a number of redently decided cases. These
show that the principles, and the doctrines which they include, are not
solely high level abstractions, as one might occasionally infer from Hall
himself, but are significant in their application to everyday occurrences
in the courts.
A. Legality. The principle of legality is embodied in three main
doctrines and a number of elaborations thereon:
i. Nulluin crimen sine lege is the requirement of a valid penal law
completely encompassing the subsequent conduct of a perpetrator. Un-
less the perpetrator's conduct falls squarely within the prohibition, there
is no crime. Thus, when a statute punishes certain prohibited acts com-
mitted with a motor vehicle "on a public highway," a defendant who
commits such acts on a private parking lot is outside the prohibition."
2. Nidlum crinen sine poena: no conduct amounts to a crime, unless
it is prescribed or proscribed by punishment, whatever else a statute lack-
ing punishment may be.47
3. Nulla poena sine lege, lastly, requires that the criminal sanction
and its range be provided for prior to the conduct in question."
Implied in these doctrines, expressed in the form of maxims, are the
45. Whatever the requisite form of mens rea may be, e.g., intention or recklessness.
46. Prillaman v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 401, 100 S.E.2d 4 (1957); People v.
Wigle, 350 Mich. 692, 86 N.W.2d 813 (1957) (motor vehicle offense "on a public high-
way" cannot lead to a conviction of one driving on a private parking lot). See State v.
Callaghan, 46 NJ. Super. 289, 134 A.2d 609 (1957), a statute invalidates city ordinances
when traffic signs improperly constructed or placed. Thus, D cannot be convicted of
wrong-way driving if one-way sign fails to comply with standards: nullum crimen.
47. Redding v. State, 165 Neb. 307, 85 N.W.2d 647 (1957) ; Jernigan v. State, 313
S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1958) ; People v. Freres, 171 N.Y.S.2d 274, 5 A.D.2d 868
(2d Dep't 1958).
48. While in the case of conflicting penal laws the latest enactment overrides the
earlier, People ex rel. Cooper v. Martin, 168 N.Y.S.2d 811, 5 A.D.2d 736 (3d Dep't 1957),
it is not possible to subject a defendant to the heavier punishment of the later statute,
unless its enactment antedates his conduct. See Miller v. State, 316 P.2d 203 (Old.
1957).
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propositions that statutes leaving the definition of criminal conduct to
administrators are unconstitutional and void.-9 Mere ambiguity, how-
ever, does not render a statute unconstitutional. Rather, of two possible
interpretations, that favoring constitutionality must be adopted, provided
that this is also the interpretation favoring the defendant.5" It is other-
wise with vague statutes which fail to inform the affected public ade-
quately of the conduct which will render them criminally liable.5 In
recent years the principle of legality has suffered some inroads from so-
called liberal construction statutes, 2 which are designed to close gaps at-
tributable to legislative oversight or sloppiness. By increasing the con-
viction rates, these statutes lull the public into a false sense of greater se-
curity from crime while, of course, actually decreasing the certainty of
convicting only parties who were so forewarned that they could in fact
be expected to behave accordingly and who by failing to act, can be said
to be guilty in terms of law and ethics.
B. Conduct. While, for the time being, one must leave the ex-
planation of the interrelation between brain and body and brain and sense
stimuli, and the interrelation of the various psychic functions, to the psy-
chologist and neurologist, we are in a position to make significant state-
ments about the role of conduct for purposes of criminal liability. Im-
possibilium nulla obligatio est.5" Just as the law can neither command
mountains to move, nor birds to stop flying, it cannot command the be-
havior of human beings who are incapable of perceiving sensory data,
ranging from the perception of one's own existence to the reception of
sensory stimuli of whatever sort, and including the capacity to direct
one's volition. This restricts the law's regulatory function to the pre-
49. State v. Zumpano, 146 N.E.2d 871 (Ohio App. 1956) ; cf. Matthews v. State,
148 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. 1958).
50. Kelly v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 324 P.2d 990
(1st Dist. Ct App. Calif. 1958) ; State v. Cusick 248 Iowa 1168, 84 N.W.2d 554 (1957).
51. "Reckless driving": State v. Pigge, 79 Idaho 529, 322 P.2d 703 (1958) ; People
v. Price, 169 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Spring Valley Police Ct. 1957); People v. Firth, 168
N.Y.S.2d 949, 3 N.Y2d 472 (1957), 19 OHio ST. L.J. 514 (1958) ; State v. Scofield, 138
A.2d 415 (R.I. 1958). "Suitable muffler . . . to prevent unnecessary noise": People
v. Zanchelli, 169 N.Y.S.2d 197, 8 Misc. 2d 1069 (Columbia County Ct. 1957) ; People v.
Sisson, 176 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Schenectady County Ct. 1958). "Other than customary street
attire": People ex rel. Lunney v. Savarese, 167 N.Y.S.2d 312, 6 Misc. 2d 734 (Spring
Valley Police Ct. 1957). "Harsh . . . and unkind treatment": People v. McCaughan,
49 Cal. 2d 409, 317 P.2d 974 (1957). See dissent by Roberts, J., in Matthews v. State,
99 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1957), as to obscenity. In People v. Diaz, 4 N.Y.2d 469 151 N.E.2d
871 (1958), a city loitering ordinance was held unconstitutional as too vague, failing to
discriminate between guilty and innocent conduct. In this respect quite clearly the
ordinance was bad. But D's conviction for innocent conduct was due to the trial court's
failure to consider inens rea, which the information alleged. In general see Note, Suffi-
ciency of Statutory Definitions, 18 LA. L. REv. 731 (1958).
52. E.g., State v. Powell, 212 Ore. 684, 321 P.2d 333, 337 (1958).
53. DIGEST 50.18.185.
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scription or proscription of conduct. Conduct is actus. The fact that it
is legally prohibited conduct with which we are concerned is, as indicated,
marked by the addition of the word reus. It is not possible to influence
a defendant (or others) by punishing him for anything not amounting
to conduct, thus, not including the elements of cognition and volition.
Prima facie, this should preclude the punishment of a relation, condition
or status. It also excludes the punishment of mere behavior, thus lacking
awareness or volition, as distinguished from conduct. Thus, while an
epileptic who, knowing that he may suffer an epileptic seizure at any mo-
ment, may well incur criminal liability for harm done during an epileptic
seizure through an instrumentality set in motion by his conduct, i.e., while
he was still in control of his faculties, because he could have stopped his
conduct at an appropriate moment, 4 a defendant who automaton-like
goes through the motions of apparent conduct, but lacking awareness,
whatever the cause, whether unknown, epilepsy, sleep-walking, hypnosis,
etc., in formal violation of law, is not guilty of a criminal offense, as one
lacking conduct. This was recently demonstrated again by a widely
publicized English case.5" In this country such cases rarely reach the
courts, but make for frequent amusing newspaper reading."°
Apart from cases in which the mind is not the least bit receptive,
there is no conduct when an event occurs which is not attributable to the
defendant's mental activity and applied volition. Thus D sitting in a
parked automobile which by itself and without D's intervention rolls a
few feet forward, simply is not "driving" the car, there being no conduct
of driving.5"
Conduct may consist of commission or omission. Either may equally
accomplish an unlawful result. While quite clearly the failure to act in
the face of a specific mandate of the law to do so, amounts to a crime
(true omission crime), offenses phrased in terms of commission may be
equally accomplished by omission, namely when there is a legal obligation
on the particular defendant to avert a consequence which, for his failure,
54. See Note, Criminal Responsibility of Epileptic Driver Who Causes Death When
Stricken ndth Sudden Epileptic "Blackout," 32 No= DALIa LAW. 688 (1957), comment-
ing on People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d 126, 138 N.E.2d 794 (1956).
55. Hill v. Baxter, [1958] 1 Q.B. 277. See the excellent articles Edwards, Auto-
inatism and Criminal Responsibility, 21 MOD. L. REv. 375 (1958) ; Prevezer, Automatism
and Involuntary Conduct, 1958 CAm. L.J. 360.
56. E.g., Crashes Into 6 Cars While Driving in Sleep, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct.
22, 1958, p. 9, cols. 4-6.
57. State v. Taft, 102 S.E.2d 152 (W. Va. 1958). Compare State v. Ruona, 321
P.2d 615 (Mont. 1958), as to what amounts to "actual physical control of any vehicle,"
and Richardson v. District of Columbia, 134 A.2d 492 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1957), to
the effect that pushing a disabled motor vehicle amounts to operating it.
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will subsequently be attributed to him as the harm he "caused."5"
C. Harm. The principle of harm is the most underdeveloped con-
cept in our criminal law. "Harm," as Hall noted, "implies interests or
values which have been destroyed, wholly or in part."59 "[H]arm is not
confined to physical injuries. . . . [It is] an essential element of every
crime [and] each legal definition of a crime . . . describes a more or
less specific harm."6
I like to think of harm as a tri-level abstraction. In the first place,
every crime entails harm in the most general sense. The mere breach of
the law, in disobedience of a mandate, is harmful to the sovereign. On
the intermediate level, the harm which a specific crime entails is recogniz-
able in part by the definition, in part by the very context in which the
crime is listed, e.g., within a code. Here we find the harm groups in
terms of broadly defined legally protected interests, like life, physical in-
tegrity, property, honor and reputation, and so on. But lastly, each crime
is meant to serve a specific purpose. Thus, the crime of larceny by false
pretenses was created not just for the general protection of rights in per-
sonal property, especially possession, but for the protection of such rights
against deprivations of a specific nature. Thus, the legally protected
specific interest is that of a certain confidence with respect to the enjoy-
ment of one's personal property rights, including those of dealing with
the property according to one's wishes. The victim's parting with his
property, in order to fall under the definition of larceny by false pre-
tenses, must have been accomplished in a particular way. Professor Sny-
der recently called the specific harm of larceny by false pretenses, the inva-
sion of the victim's "liberty . . . to deal with what is his as he himself
chooses" through a deception which nullifies what would be a free choice
but for the deception." In a recent military case, even though the spe-
cific harm of larceny by false pretenses was present, 2 it turned out that
the victim was not one cent out of pocket after the deal involved.63 Harm
of the intermediate category, that typical of larceny in general, was not
done, although the most specific harm had been accomplished. Apply-
58. The problem was excellently discussed by Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE
L.J. 590 (1958). The problem of the difference between omission and commission be-
came particularly acute, though needlessly so, in Lambert v. California, 78 S. Ct. 240
(1957). See Mueller, On Common Law Mes Rea, 42 MINN. L. Rxv. 1043 (1958).
59. HALL, CASES AND READINGS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 45 (1949).
60. Id. at 46.
61. See the valuable discussion by Snyder, False Pretenses-Harm to Person from
Whom Thing Obtained, 24 BROOxLYN L. REV. 34, 48 (1958), commenting on United
States v. Rubenstein, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 523, 22 C.M.A. 313 (1957). See also People v.
Kirkup, 173 N.Y.S.2d 574, 577, 4 N.Y.2d 209 (1958).
62. Snyder, supra note 61, at 48.
63. United States v. Rubenstein, supra note 61.
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ing the principle of legality to that of harm, it would follow that the
conviction should not have been rendered, although, of course, liability
for the attempted crime might have been considered.
The concept of specific harm was recently demonstrated in the Illi-
nois case People v. Von Rosen.6" On a charge of desecration of the
United States flag it was established that the statute had been enacted not
just for the preservation of our national emblem as such (intermediate
harm), but primarily because of the grave danger that desecration may
invite disturbances of the public peace, as the legislative history clearly
showed. For the prosecution's failure to prove this harm-the potential-
ity of peace disturbance-the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the convic-
tion. The Von Rosen case probably goes further than any other in the
application of the concept of the specific harm. The case is sound only
if the legislature can be considered to have incorporated its abstract an-
ticipation into the definition of the crime so as to make a showing of a
concrete anticipation in every case an element of the crime. It should be
clear that a mere motive for legislation does not automatically become an
element of the crime. But, as said, depending on a proper interpretation
of the legislative history, Von Rosen may have been rightly decided.
Nevertheless, the case is likely to arouse prosecution fears that courts
may continue to go equally far in subsequent cases in uncovering hitherto
unknown legislative motivations and giving them the status of defini-
tional elements. To calm such fears, suffice it to point out that, (1) since
the doctrine can work only for the protection of offenders, no prosecutor
need be afraid that his conscience might be burdened by unjustified con-
victions, (2) that the definition of most crimes points to the specific
harm explicitly, (3) that the legislative history has been closely scru-
tinized by courts, (4) that sound counter-argument will continue to be a
good weapon against unsound argument, and (5) that the principle of
legality and the rules of statutory construction are limitations on the
courts' inquisitiveness about implied harms.
In England the view has recently been expressed that there are
crimes which involve no harm. Rather, in this group of crimes, so it. is
said, a certain "mischievous tendency" takes the place of harm.6" Such
a view overlooks the fact that a "mischievous tendency," as, e.g., in reck-
less driving, is a harm in itself. Just imagine the real and quite general
feeling of insecurity which is created when at rush hour in an American
city one driver proceeds at 75 m.p.h. through a congested area. The harm
is there, even though metal may not be bent or bones broken, and even
64. 13 Ill. 2d 63, 147 N.E.2d 327 (1958).
65. WILLIAMS, CwixNIAL LAw-THE GENERAL PART 17 ,(1953).
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the absence of any bystander would not alter the legal situation, as public
anxiety certainly was not the only specific harm which the legislature
wished to prevent in creating the crime. One might think of the danger
of possible accidents due to the possibility of intervening traffic or failure
of man and machine, etc., though we need not speculate oil such possi-
bilities at this point. Suffice it to say that the harm is present when
the act is done, although it may seem remote to those engaged in the act
or others who had less occasion to contemplate on the matter than the
legislature. The quintessence of this argument is merely a concession to
the English view that there are crimes in which the harm is easy to
prove, perhaps by rebuttable presumptions, while in other crimes it takes
more than that to prove the specific harm.
It is surprising to note how often the harm principle has been neg-
lected in the court room. Unless vigorously argued by the defense, the
court, at best, will retort that some other charge might have been more
appropriate to meet the conduct in question.6" Since our law has always
been hostile to doctrinal refinement, it is not astonishing that the po-
tentials of the principle of harm are as yet largely undiscovered.
D. Causation. Professor Hall had commented on the problem of
causation in various contexts and earlier writings. But it was not until
the publication of the Studies that his full views on the topic became
known. 7 In this new work Hall dismisses those theories which fail to
view causal problems in context, with a resulting overconcentration on
mechanical causation. His solution, on the other hand, posits "that the
essential constituents-fact-finding processes and policy-are interrelated
in such ways that the factual inquiries are defined and, to a considerable
degree, determined by policy."6 A causal inquiry, therefore, would first
ascertain the sine qua non, or necessary, in the strictly physical sense,
participation of the defendant's conduct in the production of the harm."
By this standard the attribution of the harm to the defendant fails right
from the outset unless it appears that but for the defendant's conduct the
harm would not have resulted. The extent of the causal inquiry is next
limited by restrictions of "effectiveness," i.e., incidental contribution will
not suffice, the contribution must be an effective one. As Hall rightly
notes, the use of the criterion of effectiveness in causation is not confined
to law, but in law it has achieved singular significance."' The last limita-
66. Cf. Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
67. STUDIES, ci. 10.
68. Id. at 185.
69. But "harm" itself is a limitation upon the extent of the causal inquiry. Ibid.
See also Mueller, On Common Law Men Rea, 42 MINN. L. REv. 1043, 1055 (1958).
70. STUDIES 186 n.96.
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tion which is placed on a causal inquiry, according to Hall, is that pro-
vided by mels rea: "[T]he fact finding of a cause-in-law means the
finding of a cause which is a substantial factor and includes certain volun-
tary conduct signifying a required mens rea."7" I can subscribe to the
proposition that voluntary conduct is the final limitation upon cause-in-
law. I differ with Professor Hall on the conclusion that such involves
mens rea. As I discussed elsewhere in greater detail, melts rea "is the
ethico-legal negative value of the deed (appearing in various legally pre-
scribed forms)."72 Thus, it is nothing but the defendant's awareness
that what he is doing is not approved by the community of which he is a
member, though sometimes it is the failure to exert one's conscience so as
to gain an awareness. As far as I can see, mens rea in that common law
sense is too far removed from causation to be part thereof by construc-
tion. But when Professor Hall speaks of "voluntary conduct," he places
the third restriction on the cause-in-law attribution rightly. A prediction
or foreseeability as to whether or not a certain conduct will produce a
certain consequence is properly subsumable under the primary principle of
conduct, and, after all, causation is nothing but an auxiliary principle for
joining actus and harm. Therefore, prediction or foreseeability becomes
properly the third limitation on the causation inquiry. For example, a
child's conduct resulting in the production of the harm of a broken bottle
will entail an inquiry-after ascertainment of the physical relation as
such and the effectiveness, or materiality, of the child's conduct in the
production of the harm-into whether the child could or did predict that,
upon being thrown upon the floor, the bottle would break. The causal
inquiry for the purpose of imputation of the harm ends with a finding
that the child did or did not (e.g., all its previous experience had been
with plastic bottles) know that breakage might result. Cause within the
meaning of the criminal law is attributed when a positive finding as to
predictability is made. But causation, even in this sense as extended in
meaning for purposes of the criminal law, does not suffice for the im-
position of guilt or blame. In our example, disciplinary blame will be
imposed only when the child knew of the existence of a prohibition of
bottle throwing, whether it approved of the prohibition or not. Ob-
viously, both law and household discipline no longer permit any argument
about the awareness as to rules which by long standing and tradition
have become part of cultural heritage and thus second nature. Even
where such knowledge existed, it remains, however, to be ascertained
whether the child, or the wrongdoer, produced the harm with the required
71. Id. at 187.
72. Mueller, supra note 69, at 1061.
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form of attitude, i.e., negligence, recklessness, intention, or whatever the
form requirement may be. In so adding guilt, or mens rea, in its appro-
priate form, to causal imputation, for the purpose of establishing liability,
we are no longer within the realm of causal inquiry.
Notwithstanding any possible disagreement as to the precise nature
of the third limitation on causal inquiry-conduct or mens rea-there is
abundant agreement on the major proposition, namely that policy con-
siderations are necessary in causal inquiries. This opinion is shared by
a thoughtful scholar of international renown, Dean Ryu,73 who recently
agreed that the meaning of cause-in-law "can be found only by inquiry
into the policy of law."74  These policy-oriented views stand in sharp
contrast to some others recently expressed in England, and holding that
policy has nothing to do with the determination of causal issues."
A comment on the remaining principle, that of punishment, would
lead us too far afield in this context.76 But did we really exhaust the list
of principles? My curiosity was aroused when in one of the chapters of
the Studies I read that, according to Hall, there might be one or two other
principles of significance to criminal theory." There is no elaboration
on this remark. The statement is somewhat astonishing since I had
found the seven stated principles to be perfect working tools, covering all
of the subject of criminal law. It appears to me that any further prin-
ciple would, on close inspection, turn out to be a doctrine subsumable
under one of the existing principles. The utility concept might be a prin-
ciple of this sort. While Professor Hall did not cover this concept in
the Studies, the context of this essay requires a brief comment. A re-
cent publication by Professor Scott" has convinced me more than ever
that the utility principle is extremely relevant, though its inclusion in
criminal theory is another matter.
E. Utility. While the utility, wisdom or reasonableness of penal
legislation is supposedly no concern of the courts,"9 as long as a statute is
not clearly in vi6lation of some constitutional provision, and is, therefore,
73. Ryu, Causation in Criminal Law, 106 U. PA. L. tRv. 773 (1958).
74. Id. at 805. Like myself, Dean Ryu warns against too much reliance on the test
of responsibility for that of causation.
75. Compare Hart & HonorS, Causation in the Law, 72 L.Q. REv. 58, 260, 398
(1956), &ith Professor Hall's answer in STUDIEs 187-99.
76. See Mueller, Criinnal Law and Procedure, in 1959 ANN. SuRVEY Au. L., 34
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 83 (1959).
77. STsuiES' 153.
78. Scott, Con.stitutional Limitations on Substantive Criminal Law, 29 RocKY MT.
L. REv. 275, 280-83 (1957). " . ..
-79. But see 'People v. Lomazow, 176 N.Y.S.2d 456, 11 Misc. 2d 488 (2d Dep't 1958).
Defendant's sole defense was. an offer to prove that the regulation was unreasonable.
The trial court rejected his offer. On appeal the court said, "We cannot say that de-
fendant had his day in court." Id. at 457, 11 Misc. 2d at 488.
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virtually solely a legislative matter,"0 Professor Scott recently demon-
strated that this is simply not so in practice. Indeed, in recent years
courts have in refreshingly bold opinions frustrated legislative intentions
when a statute was utterly ridiculous or useless. Although courts feel
usually bound to assign other reasons, like lack of equal protection,"' or
of due process,82 the absence of legislative wisdom is the real rationale
for the court's decision voiding the statute, and occasionally the legisla-
tive intention is judicially frustrated without any reference to the consti-
tution.s3 Perhaps as long as our legislatures continue poor batting aver-
ages in devising laws aimed at the eradication of real or imagined evils,"
we should not deny our courts the right to double-check on legislative
wisdom." Nevertheless, on the whole, courts in this country have used
restraint in the face of often the severest of provocations by phantastic
legislative products.88
It is impossible to talk of a trend in subjecting criminal legislation
to a judicial utility scrutiny. No more can be said than that the inclina-
tion exists, and perhaps justifiably so, although it may be inconsistent
with constitutional doctrine. But quite apart from that, the fact that
utility is not a concept pertaining to the intrinsic validity or structure of
crime should keep us from making it one of the principles.
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW
In chapter one of the Studies, Hall explained that "these principles
do not refer to the criminal law of all times, but only to present criminal
law. . . . [T]he fact that the above theory of criminal law is not ap-
plicable to all rules which are often called 'criminal laws' does not invali-
date the theory. Indeed, the fact that the theory does not fit public
welfare offenses, other areas of strict liability, and various archaic or
arbitrary enactments is not relevant to the validity or the significance of
the theory."8 7
80. United States v. Kissinger, 250 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1958) ; People ex rel. Gayle
v. Samuel Adler, Inc., 177 N.Y.S.2d 361 (N.Y. Magis. Ct. 1958).
81. People v. Bowen, 175 N.Y.S.2d 125, 11 Misc. 2d 462 (1st Dep't 1958).
82. Walters v. Blackburn, 104 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1958).
83. State v. Varsalona, 309 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1958) ; Wisniewski v. United States,
247 F.2d 292 (8th Cir. 1957).
84. For comments on the utilitarian aspects of trucking legislation see Mueller,
Book Note, 51 LAw LID. J. 252 (1958), commenting on United States v. Tank Truck
Rentals, Inc., 78 S. Ct. 507 (1958), and Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R.
Presidents' Conference, 155 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
85. Fortunately, it is still true that at least the most obviously nonsensical proposals
for more and tougher penal laws die in the capitols or on the way thereto. A typicil
example was the proposed New York baby sitter license law. See, Licenses Urged for
Baby Sitters, N.Y. World Tele. and Sun, Feb. 11, 1958, p. 17, cols. 1 and 2.
86. United States v. Patterson, 155 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
87. STUDIES 15.
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Such a view requires close scrutiny. A theory of criminal law has
a double purpose, namely, to portray existing law with the highest pos-
sible fidelity, while also positing the empirically better (more effective)
rules as between competing alternatives. Once empirical tests on samples
of all constituent members of the class to which the theory applies show
that this aim has been accomplished-and it is my conviction that Hall's
theory meets both requirements by all available tests-we can claim uni-
versal validity for the theory within the realm of its posited applicability,
here at least American or Anglo-American penal law. It would seem,
therefore, that the criminal theory developed by Hall through Integrative
Jurisprudence is applicable to the entirety of criminal law and that in-
cludes (and here I claim to improve on Hall's statement) archaic and
arbitrary enactments among which are so-called public welfare offenses.
These do not deserve that name since very few offenses in this category
have anything to do with the public welfare, many of them actually op-
posing public welfare by the nature of their aim or application, and most
of them being covert revenue measures. Others are being enforced pri-
marily to collect fines so as to finance the administration of their enforce-
ment. Now it is true that for some of these regulatory offenses criminal
theory is "inapplicable"-but that is only a manner of speaking-because
one or the other of the seven principles may have been consistently ig-
nored in the past. This is especially true of the mens rea principle. But
such ignoring, stemming obviously from ignorance, does not exempt these
offenses from the realm of criminal law or its theory. It only shows that,
tested back against the principles, these offenses are arbitrary enactments
and wrong, or enactments arbitrarily enforced and wrong. Reference to
the principles, in other words, would demonstrate how improvements can
be achieved. Compliance with all the principles which the theory im-
bodies is necessary for effectiveness of the penal law, as the theory con-
tains neither superfluous principles nor inferior choices. Thus, a crimi-
nal enactment which neglects any of the principles is bound to be in-
effective, and if ineffective, it simply is a wrong choice pointing to a
certain deficiency in intelligence, information or integrity on the part of
those who put the offense on the statute books or enforce it.8"
I believe, therefore, that greater universality for the principles may
be claimed than Hall was willing to assume. This finds further support
in comparative law. No nation of our present level of civilization oper-
ates its criminal law without the principles as they are also incorporated
in Hall's theory. As to mens rea it is true that minor inconsistencies, not
88. Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MINN. L. REv. 1043 (1958).
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even comparable to our wholesale deviations in the regulatory field, exist
in several foreign countries, but it is also true that countries advanced in
science, technology, theory and culture, have embraced inens rea without
any limitation whatsoever.89 The only other principle the universality of
which among modern nations has ever been doubted, is that of legality.
But here, too, the exceptions are more apparent than real. The Nazi-
German deviation" was a limited one and, besides, it was practically nul-
lified by the conservatism of the judiciary, to the "Fuehrer's" furor, and
lasted less than ten years. Section 16 of the Penal Code of the Russian
Federated Soviet Republic, providing for a similar analogy and, thus,
abrogating the legality principle, seems to have been repudiated and is
probably no longer applied.9' It appears that even dictators realize the
futility of operating a penal law at maximum effectiveness, whatever the
political purpose of the prohibitions, unless all of the principles of crimi-
nal theory are applied. An out and out break with legality, as once pro-
posed by Ferri,9 appeared so outrageous that not even Mussolini could
be moved to sanction it,9" and the theory which has adopted more from
Ferri's positivism than any other, the Social Defense Movement, has
pledged its firm allegiance to legality.9
The Danish exception to the legality principle, lastly, is almost en-
tirely academic. Section 1 of the Danish Penal Code subjects to punish-
ment only acts punishable under a statute "or acts of entirely similar
nature.""5  On the whole, Danish courts have exercised wise discretion in
the application of this section so that rarely were results achieved which
would shock the conscience of an American judge, Mr. Justice Holmes
in McBoyle v. United States6 notwithstanding. But to the extent that
89. E.g., § 2 of the DRAFT OF THE GENERAL PART OF A PENAL CODE, IN CONFORMITY
WITH THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GRAND COMMISSION OF PENAL REFoRm, first reading,
published by the Ministry of Justice, German Federal Republic, Bonn 1958, reads:
§ 2. No punishinent without guilt.
Anybody acting without guilt cannot be punished.
The punishment may not exceed the degree of guilt.
Translation of the Comparative Criminal Law Project, New York University, p. 1
(1958). "Guilt" is the equivalent of our substance of nzens rea.
90. Old § 2 of the GERMAN PENAL CODE. See GsovsxI, THE STATUTORY CRIMINAL
LAW OF GERMANY 4 (1947).
91. Berman, Soviet Law Reforin-Dateline Moscow 1957, 66 YALE L.J. 1191, 1203-
04 (1957).
92. Ferri, The Reform of Penal Law in Italy, 12 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S. 178 (1921).
93. See Battaglini, The Fascist Reform of the Penal Law in Italy, 24 J. CRIm. L.,
C. & P.S. 278 (1933).
94. Holmberg, Introduction, NORDISK KRIMINALISTISK ARSBOK XVIII (1958).
95. DANISH COMMITTEE ON ComPARATIVE LAw, THE DANISH CRIMINAL CODE 21
(1958).
96. 283 U.S. 25 (1931).
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Danish courts have indeed applied analogy to the defendant's detriment,"
Danish scholars have not withheld their criticism.9"
The recognition of the universality of the principles of criminal law
for the human being who is psychologically conditioned by the forces
extant in the 20th century, both in Eastern and Western culture, which
can be gained through application of the comparative method, points to
the value of the new method or science.9" Hall belongs to those who have
long championed the use of comparative law in the criminal law field, and
he has been among the most active members of our small community of
criminal law scholars in actually practicing what he preaches. The crimi-
nal law journals of many foreign countries have welcomed his contribu-
tions. In the Studies he devoted one chapter to "Culture, Comparative
Law and Jurisprudence."' Here we find an interesting answer to our
question on the universality of the principles of criminal law:
[D]o the principles and doctrines, the generalizations of the
Anglo-American system, conform to or differ from those in
the codes? I think one answer is that the generalizations were
everywhere derived by pretty much the same methods of trained
imagination ('induction') which recognized resemblances or
universals, and that throughout the process there is a give-
and-take between certain tentatively held general notions and
specific data until the initial generalizations are confirmed or
modified, or others are discovered and substituted for them.1 '
While the groupings of foreign systems may differ, the recogni-
tions are identical to those which Hall placed in the seven principles, and
the methods for arriving at these conclusions were analogous.
As to comparative law itself, Hall comes to the conclusion, certainly
not universally adhered to; that comparative law is not just a method
"since that would make it indistinguishable from either legal science or,
97. Tapping telephone wire punished analogous to violation of mail secrecy, U.f.R.
1940, p. 156. Slander by anonymous telephone call punished analogous to anyonymous
libel, U.f.R. 1935, p. 1147.
98. HuRwiTz, DEN DANSKE KRImINALRET 139 (1950); Marcus, Das Strafrecht
Dinenarks, in 1 MEZGER-SCH6NKE-JESCHECK, DAS AuSLANDISCHE STRAFREC31T DMn
GEGENWiART 67, 85-86 (1955).
99. Comparative Law is not a novel subject. Practically all cultures are known to
have engaged in comparative law. But as a science, comparative law is a modern human
achievement. In criminal law the century span from the late 18th to the late 19th cen-
tury witnessed its development. The fascinating history of this human progress remains
to be written for English speaking readers.
100. STUmES, ch. 6, heretofore unpublished, based on lectures given in Korea in the
summer of 1954.
101. STUmS 111-12.
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at the other extreme, from the methods of ordinary legal analysis."' 2
Rather, "there is a distinctive substantive side" to it, although to describe
it would seem rather "arbitrary."' 3 I do hope that somebody some day
will be able to prove this point. I find myself unable to do so, but am
nevertheless convinced of the usefulness of comparative law, even if
only a method." 4
CONCLUSION
This discourse on the Studies, and especially the "principles," may
not have done justice"5 to the magnificent contribution to criminal law
which Jerome Hall has made through the creation of the first American
theory of criminal law. There is a temptation to conclude with the
clich6 of the whetted appetite. But the context calls for much stronger
language. Let those who are too conservative or feeble stick to criminal
law notions which are those of an unsophisticated past era. In the age
where human brains seek the road to greatest perfection, it is a matter of
survival to operate with the most refined knowledge the human mind can
provide. Here is one aspect of the world struggle between philosophies
which may appear remote to some lawyers. The better ideas will win the
struggle. But it is also a predictable chain reaction which will go forth
from the classrooms and the books to the courts and legislatures. There
the struggle will be fought too, and again, the better ideas will win. There
will be a day when the unlearned member of our learned profession will
pit stone against armor or Ethelbert's laws against the jurisprudence of
a modern society. Knowledge is power. And in criminal law knowledge
means a firm grounding in the philosophy and theory of our subject. To
have alerted us to these facts is Jerome Hall's greatest merit, and the
Studies demonstrate this perhaps more than any previous work.
102. STUDIES 116-17.
103. Id. at 117.
104. Mueller, The Teaching of Comparative Law in the Course on Criminal Law,
11 J. Lc Lr E .59, 49 J. Cvas. L., C. & P.S. 101 (1958).
105. It appeared impossible in this essay to make due mention of the valuable chap-
ters on Crine as Social Reality (ch. 11) ; Federal Criminal Procedure (ch. 12) ; Science
and Reform in Criminal Law (ch. 13) ; Revision of Criminal Law (ch. 14).
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APPENDIXt
The following is a complete chronological list of criminal law case-
books compiled and reviewed by Professor Mueller:
1856-57 E. W. BENNET AND FRANKLIN F. HEAD, A SELECTION OF
LEADING CASES IN CRIMINAL LAW (1st ed.).
1869 BENNET AND HEAD, 2d ed.
1884 LAWSON, A COLLECTION OF LEADING CASES IN CRIMINAL LAW
(Lawson was a professor at University of Missouri Law
School).
1885 ALBERT PHALEN, CRIMINAL CASES (2 vols.) (Phalen prac-
ticed law in Chicago).
1886-91 WALTER S. SHIRLEY, A SELECTION OF LEADING CASES IN THE
CRIMINAL LAW (American notes by Horace W. Rumsey).
1891 CHAPLIN, CASES IN CRIMINAL LAW (temp. ed.).
1893-94 JOSEPH H. BEALE, CASE BOOK IN CRIMINAL LAW (1st ed.).
1896 CHAPLIN, perm. ed.
1902 JEROME C. KNOWLTON, CASES ON 'CRIMINAL LAW (Prof.
Knowlton taught at University of Michigan Law School).
1903 WILLIAM E. MIKELL, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW (1st ed.).
1907 BEALE, 2d ed.
1908 MIKELL, short ed.
1914 AUGUSTIN DERBY, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW (1st ed.).
1915 BEALE, 3d ed.
1917 DERBY, 2d ed.
1922 THOMAS W. HUGHES, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PRO-
CEDURE.
1923 DERBY, 3d ed.
1925 MIKELL, 2d ed.
1927 FRANCIS B. SAYRE, A SELECTION OF CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW.
1928 EDWIN R. KEEDY, CASES ON ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
LAW.
1928 BEALE, 4th ed.
1930 DERBY, 3d ed.
1933 DERBY, 4th ed.
1933 LIVINGSTON HALL & SHELDON GLUECK, CASES ON CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT (Ist ed.).
1933 MIKELL, 3d ed.
1935 ALBERT J. HARNO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE (1st ed.).
t This appendix supports the text at 121-13 supra.
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1935 MIKELL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
1935 MIKELL, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (4th ed.).
1937 JOHN B. WAITE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCE-
MENT (1st ed.).
1939 HARNO, 2d ed.
1939 CHARLES A. KEIGWIN, CASES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
1940 JEROME MICHAEL AND HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS ADMINISTRATION.
1940 L. HALL AND GLUECK, 2d ed.
1942 JAMES J. ROBINSON, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PRO-
CEDURE.
1947 WAITE, 2d ed.
1948 GEORGE H. DESSION, CRIMINAL LAW, ADMINISTRATION AND
PUBLIC ORDER.
1949 JEROME HALL, CASES AND READINGS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE.
1950 HARNO, 3d ed.
1950 AUGUSTIN DERBY AND LESTER ORFIELD, CASES ON CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE.
1951 L. HALL AND GLUECK, 3d ed.
1952 ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW.
1952 ANDREW V. CLEMENTS, CASES, COMMENTS AND TEXT ON
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE.
1953 ORVILL C. SNYDER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TEXT AND CASES.
1954 GEORGE L. CLARK, CRIMINAL LAW, CASES AND TEXT.
1955 EDWIN R. KEEDY AND ROBERT E. KNOWLTON, CASES AND
STATUTES ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW.
1957 HARNO, 4th ed.
1958 L. HALL AND GLUECK, 4th ed.

